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System but also may not reflect the views of any-
one else at the Fed, past or present. I thank my
colleagues at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
for their comments, but I retain full responsibility
for errors.
ASSESSING THE ECONOMY
An area where Fed practice and market prac-
tice are essentially identical is in assessing the
state of the economy and the outlook. Private
sector and Fed forecasters use similar methods
and rely on the same statistical information.
Obviously, there are professional differences of
opinion and of approaches, but these do not create
a divide between Fed and private forecasts. As I
have often put it, economists inside and outside
the Fed studied at the same universities under
the same professors and read the same journal
articles. There is substantial movement of econo-
mists into and out of the Federal Reserve System.
Fed economists attend many university seminars,
and academic economists attend Fed seminars.
Disagreements about forecasts are similar inside
and outside of the Fed.
There is a difference in the informal or anec-
dotal information available inside and outside
the Fed. The Fed has a large network of business
contacts and relies on them to augment the fore-
E
veryone looks at the world through
lenses colored by his or her own expe-
riences and background. Over my nine
plus years at the Fed, I have been struck
by misunderstandings of why the Fed acts as it
does—misunderstandings from vantage points
that are quite different from that of a Fed official.
Those with Fed experience do know things that
others do not. Some of what we know is confi-
dential, but such information is in most cases
disclosed with a lag. There are few permanent
secrets. Still, there is a central-banker way of
thinking that can be described and analyzed;
doing so may help others to avoid mistakes in
assessing Fed policy. That is my topic in these
remarks.
Obviously, all I can do is to describe how one
particular central banker with the initials W.P.
thinks about what he does. And my perspective
is that from a particular central bank, the Federal
Reserve. My Fed colleagues might put things dif-
ferently and might believe that I am off base with
some of my comments. Nevertheless, I think the
effort is worthwhile, for the degree of success of
monetary policy is positively correlated with how
completely the market understands the Fed. My
disclaimer is that the views I express here are
mine. These views not only do not necessarily
reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve
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have access to data and information the Fed does
not. Large financial firms in particular have access
to data, such as credit card activity and prospec-
tive borrowing by major clients, that the Fed does
not have. Retail firms have extremely current
information on sales and orders. Of course, the
Fed may obtain some of this information through
its business contacts, but private companies often
make much more systematic use of their own
internal business information than the Fed does.
Forecasters continually provide updates based
on the flow of current information, both statisti-
cal and informal. In this regard, Fed and market
practice is essentially identical.
There is, however, a difference between the
Fed and the market in the use of forecast informa-
tion. Traders and portfolio managers base their
trades on the current flow of information, which
needs to be updated throughout the trading day.
Fed policymakers, on the other hand, do not con-
tinuously adjust the stance of policy in the same
way managers adjust portfolio holdings. For this
reason, my own practice is not to worry much as
to whether I have correctly absorbed the import
of each day’s, or each hour’s, data. I know that
some information will be irrelevant to my policy
position because it will be superseded by new
information by the time of the next FOMC meet-
ing. For example, I do not need hour-by-hour
information on security prices. When I get to
the next FOMC meeting, I’ll have the latest data,
charts of how security prices have behaved
since the previous meeting, and analyses of price
behavior over a much longer period—indeed, for
as far back in time as I find helpful. Given that
the FOMC does not adjust policy continuously,
updating my forecast with every data release
would not be an efficient use of my time.
A consequence of the fact that FOMC meet-
ings occur at six-week intervals, on average, is
that when I give a speech and take questions I may
not be completely up to date on the implications
of the latest data. In my speeches and discussions
of policy with various audiences, I try to concen-
trate on longer-run issues and general principles.
I emphasize that I will be studying all the data
and anecdotal information in the days leading
up to an FOMC meeting. Thus, I ordinarily do
not give detailed answers to questions on the
precise implications of the latest data for the
economic outlook. In many cases, I just haven’t
studied the implications thoroughly, although I
certainly do so by the time the FOMC next meets.
DEALING WITH RISK
A private firm, especially a financial firm,
must have robust policies to address risk. To an
economist, risk is a two-sided concept. Outcomes
may be above or below prior expectations. The
possibility of an outcome far below expectation
deserves special attention, for such an outcome
may force a firm into bankruptcy. A financial firm
models risk quantitatively, to the extent possible,
and then examines with great care the extent to
which formal models may miss key risks, perhaps
because they were not observed during the sam-
ple period used to fit a model or because the eco-
nomic environment may be changing. A central
bank has a similar task. Quantification of risks to
the economy should be taken as far as possible
and then careful thought applied to risks beyond
those that can be captured in models.
One important difference between a financial
firm and the central bank is that a firm has a much
wider array of strategies available to mitigate risk
than does a central bank. A financial firm can
make careful calculations of the extent of duration
mismatch between assets and liabilities and can
adjust its positions continuously to control the
extent of mismatch. A financial firm can deal in
many derivatives markets to control risk. A finan-
cial firm has wide latitude in choosing how much
risk to accept.
A central bank pretty much has to accept
policy risks to the economy arising from the
economy’s institutional structure and market
environment. Market sentiment, bullish or bear-
ish, can change quickly. Analytically, the central
bank can explore implications of various possible
scenarios and can engage in special information
collection to try to understand as quickly as pos-
sible what is happening in the economy. Beyond
that, what a central bank can do is to adopt from
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stance in an effort to control risk, especially by
guarding against particularly costly possible out-
comes. When inflation risk is the dominant con-
cern, policy should lean on the restrictive side
and policymakers should be more ready to tighten
than to ease policy. Conversely, when deflation
and/or recession risk predominates, policy should
be asymmetric toward policy ease. However,
there is always the danger of leaning in one
direction too far or too long; policymakers must
be prepared to reverse course and should try not
to allow the stance of policy to drift too far from
a baseline approach.
It is worth emphasizing that the central bank,
as the dominant player in the money market, is
in a different situation than is a competitive firm.
The central bank’s strategy in mitigating risk
must work through the markets and by shaping
accurate market expectations about future central
bank behavior.
The list of possible risks facing private firms
and central banks is a long one. A risk that is
often incompletely understood by those outside
management is reputational risk. The issue is
much more than simple embarrassment. Trust is
an essential capital asset for a financial firm, and
for a central bank. A damaged reputation can send
customers fleeing to competitors. For a central
bank, a damaged reputation can lead market
participants to question the bank’s policy consis-
tency, its motivations, and even its veracity. For
these reasons, successful private sector firms and
central banks both invest heavily in programs
and procedures to ensure fair dealing and high
ethical standards. With regard to reputational risk,
the issues inside and outside the central bank
are essentially identical. Financial firms and
central banks understand each other very well
on this dimension of managing risk.
ASSESSING ODDS ON FED
POLICY ACTION
Market participants are constantly assessing
the odds on Fed policy actions at upcoming
FOMC meetings. These assessments register
directly in market prices, especially in the federal
funds futures and options markets and the similar
markets in eurodollars. There is an important
policy purpose for the Fed to study these market
expectations. Understanding how the flow of new
information affects market expectations can be
useful to policymakers. For example, suppose I
interpret a surprise change in employment to be
an anomaly in the data but I observe a large market
reaction to the data release. In that case, I would
reexamine my interpretation, and if I still believe
I am correct I might comment during the Q&A
session after a speech that my own personal take
on the data differs from the market view. My
aim would be to prompt market participants to
reexamine their interpretation of the data.
Consider another example of the importance
of tracking market expectations. When I examine
the federal funds futures market, a large discrep-
ancy between market expectations and my “best
guess” of the FOMC’s future actions might suggest
to me the possibility of a Fed communications
failure. The ideal situation is one in which the
market and the Fed have read available informa-
tion the same way. I am only one participant in
the FOMC process, but I try not to contribute to
market misunderstanding of monetary policy.
The market is collating information from all FOMC
participants, paying especially close attention,
of course, to the Chairman’s views.
I also follow market data carefully as part of
ongoing research on how market expectations
are formed. This research, conducted with econ-
omists in the St. Louis Fed’s Research Division,
helps me to understand monetary policy at a
deeper level. My perspective in this research is
essentially the same as similar research conducted
in universities and by active market participants.
OBJECTIVES
Private firms have the goal of profit maximiza-
tion, whereas the central bank is pursuing the
macroeconomic goals of price stability, employ-
ment stability at a high level, and financial market
stability. The private sector and monetary policy
goals are quite different, but that fact does not, in
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approach.
Policymakers think in terms of a loss function
that depends on departures of outcomes from
desired outcomes. Policy goals are quantifiable
and, as with profits, come with short and long
horizons. As already discussed, private firms
and central banks must understand and control
risks to the extent possible.
Private firm and central bank governing and
disciplining processes are, of course, quite differ-
ent. Nevertheless, analytical approaches to achiev-
ing goals are quite similar. I do not believe that
differences of objectives and governing processes
define an essential difference between the two
types of organizations. Thus, in this respect those
in the private sector and in the central bank
understand and relate to each other easily.
PRICE MAKERS VERSUS PRICE
TAKERS
What is a critically important difference
between a central bank and a private financial firm
is that the central bank, in the short run anyway,
sets a policy interest rate and importantly influ-
ences longer-term interest rates through effects on
market expectations. The central bank is a price
maker in the interbank funds market. Private
financial firms are essentially price takers in that
market and in the government securities market.
A typical trader or portfolio manager can
plan security purchases and sales with little or
no regard to any effects on market prices or the
behavior of other firms. Of course, this statement
is not precisely true for very large portfolios, but
the difference in market impact between a central
bank and a large private portfolio is enormous.
The fact that a central bank is a price maker
makes its strategy fundamentally different from
that of a portfolio manager. To achieve policy
goals, the central bank must think of its policy
actions as following a predictable policy rule that
the private sector can observe. A portfolio man-
ager responds to the flow of new information
partly as it affects probabilities of future central
bank action.
I pointed out earlier that both market partici-
pants and policymakers try to understand the
implications of the flow of information for policy
actions. Now I want to emphasize the important
point that policymakers have the task of design-
ing systematic policy responses to new informa-
tion. The design should advance achievement
of policy goals, such as price stability. There are
many dimensions to policy design. A simple
example is that the Federal Reserve now adjusts
its target for the federal funds rate in multiples of
25 basis points. That may seem a trivial example,
but in the past the Fed sometimes adjusted its
funds rate target by smaller amounts. Another
example is disclosure of the policy decision
promptly after the decision. That practice started
only in 1994 and ever since the FOMC has almost
constantly grappled with disclosure issues.
I could point to many other dimensions of
defining a policy rule, or response function
(Poole, 2005). My point is not to elaborate on the
nature of the policy rule but instead to emphasize
how different that responsibility is from that of a
portfolio manager. Policymakers should shape
their policy actions by conscious decisions about
how to guide market thinking not just in the con-
text of a particular policy action but also in the
future for policy actions in general. Put another
way, when economic conditions recur, policy
responses to the same set of conditions should
also recur. If that were not the case, then policy
actions could be interpreted only as random,
unpredictable responses to changes in economic
conditions. It simply cannot be good policy for
policy actions to be essentially random.
The market interprets every policy action
and every policy statement in the context of past
actions and statements. What is a surprise and
what is expected depends on past practice. The
implication of this obvious point is that every
policy action needs to be based on an understand-
ing of how the action will be regarded in the
future. Policy actions set precedents, and policy-
makers must be careful about those precedents.
Otherwise, what appears to be a policy success
today could be the seed of a policy problem in
the future.
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importance of policy predictability for good policy
outcomes (Taylor, 1984). The difference in per-
spective from standard practice 30 years ago is
profound and incompletely recognized by many
journalists and commentators. Even in the early
Greenspan years, many thought that monetary
policy worked by creating surprises. That perspec-
tive was natural because policy surprises had
visible effects on security prices.
Theoretical developments in macroeconomics
in the 1970s emphasized that policy surprises
were undesirable. Efficient planning in the private
sector requires that expectations about govern-
ment policies be accurate, or as accurate as the
inherent uncertainty of the economic environ-
ment permits. Policymakers ought not to add to
inherent economic uncertainty. It is desirable that,
to the maximum possible extent, the economy
be characterized by an expectational equilibrium
in which the market behaves as policymakers
expect and the central bank behaves as the market
expects. There are certainly times, however, when
policy surprises are unavoidable.
So, much of my own thinking is driven by an
effort to help define a policy that will increase
policy predictability over time. In my speeches
and ensuing Q&A, I try to emphasize general
policy principles rather than the current policy
situation. What is important is not the policy
action at the next FOMC meeting, which is typi-
cally what people want to know, but the policy
regularity that will extend across many FOMC




An important corollary to the task of defining
a policy rule is that the central bank ought not to
be a source of random disturbances. All of us are
well aware of the potential for saying things
inadvertently that will create market misunder-
standing of likely future Fed policy actions. Or,
more precisely, what needs to be understood is
how and why various possible economic condi-
tions would justify particular appropriate policy
responses. One way to avoid misinformation is
to avoid providing any information. Put another
way, if my mouth is not open, I cannot put my
foot into it.
In my view, however, it is important to try to
convey correct information. I do not believe that
I would be doing my job if fear of providing mis-
information led me to provide no information.
For this reason, I have maintained an active speak-
ing schedule.
I do follow some general practices designed
to reduce missteps. I try to schedule speeches,
and certainly press interviews, for times when
the markets are closed. That allows the market to
digest what I say overnight. Another practice is
that I never predict the outcome of future FOMC
meetings. Given that I am only one participant in
those meetings and that the Chairman’s opinion
carries great weight, predicting the outcome
would be foolish. That is obvious, but what is
less obvious is that I do my best to avoid being
committal even in my own mind about the policy
implications of recent data. Clearly, I could draw
conclusions from available data that would create
a certain presumption about the policy decision
or at least about my policy position. I am very
cautious about drawing firm implications about
policy from the data.
I emphasize that my policy position will
depend on all the information available at the
time of the FOMC meeting, on the staff analysis,
and on the debate during the meeting. That
description of my attitude is literally correct. I
noted earlier that I often do not focus on the data
arriving day by day because I know that new data
will supersede existing data and that I will benefit
from my own intensive preparation before each
meeting. I rely on the expert staff analysis pre-
pared for each FOMC meeting. Given the com-
plexity and dynamic nature of the issues, I find
it best not to form a settled policy position well
in advance of the meeting.
Moreover, what policy purpose would be
served by my discussing publicly every twist and
turn of my analysis between FOMC meetings?
Market effects from doing so would not serve a
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violate one of the important findings in macro-
economics that policy should not create random
disturbances.
BASICS OF POLICY STRATEGY
I have emphasized the importance of the
central banker perspective in conveying a policy
strategy. I will conclude by sketching the appro-
priate strategy as I see it.
First, the central bank should be clear as to
its goals. The most fundamental goal is maximum
possible sustainable economic growth, which in
my mind motivates the dual mandate in the law
for the Federal Reserve to strive for price stability
and high employment. Price stability, which is
uniquely a central bank responsibility, contributes
greatly to the goal of maximum sustainable growth.
Price stability is not in conflict with high employ-
ment but contributes to it.
I personally believe, and have so stated on
numerous occasions, that the inflation goal should
be quantified. I know that many disagree on this
point. In today’s economy, I believe that a quan-
tified inflation goal is not critically important but
quantification might be of great importance in
the future. I ask this question: If the Fed had had
a specific inflation goal in 1965, would that com-
mitment have helped to avoid the Great Inflation?
I think the answer to the question is “yes.” If that
is the correct answer, then the United States might
have avoided a very costly 15-year period of infla-
tion, or the period might have been shorter.
A central bank cannot fix the level of
employment or its rate of growth, or the average
rate of unemployment. However, the central bank
can contribute to employment stability. Avoiding,
or at least cushioning, recessions is an important
goal. This goal should not be viewed as in conflict
with price stability. The most serious employment
disaster in U.S. history was the Great Depression,
which was a consequence of monetary policy mis-
takes that led to ongoing serious deflation. Simi-
larly, the period of the Great Inflation saw four
recessions in 14 years. Price stability is an essen-
tial precondition for overall economic stability.
We have tentative signs that the financial
markets are beginning to recover from the recent
upset, but financial fragility is obviously still an
issue. If the upset were to deepen in a sustained
way, it might have serious consequences for
employment stability. As of today, we just do not
know what the consequences may be. My best
guess is that the inherent resilience of the U.S.
economy along with future policy actions, should
they be desirable, will keep the economy on a
track of moderate average growth and gradually
declining inflation over the next few years.
Similar bouts of financial market instability
in the nineteenth century on up to the financial
panic of 1907 led Congress to pass the Federal
Reserve Act in 1912. A fundamental responsibility
of the central bank is to contribute to orderly and
efficient functioning of financial markets. The
financial market upset of 2007 will join the his-
tory of upsets including those in 1970, 1984, 1987,
and 1998. Each upset has different specifics but
all of them have common characteristics, includ-
ing especially a flight to safe assets.
I believe that part of the policy strategy ought
to be to convey as clearly as possible to the market
what the central bank is doing and why. A policy
strategy that is a mystery to the markets will not
serve the central bank well. Of course, the market
will observe what the central bank does and infer
many aspects of the strategy from those observa-
tions. Nevertheless, central bank strategy always
relies in part on judgments about incoming infor-
mation, such as whether a particular data release
has anomalous features and should be discounted.
The strategy of a central bank should be institu-
tionalized and enduring. The strategy should not
change just because the official roster changes. The
strategy should evolve as economic knowledge
improves and as economic conditions change.
I hope these remarks are useful. They do, in
any event, explain something about how I have
approached my responsibilities.
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